Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Synthese

Abstract

David Lewis objected to theories that posit necessary connections between distinct entities and to theories that involve a magical grasping of their primitives. In On the Plurality of Worlds, Lewis objected to nondescript ersatzism on these grounds (and thus branded it as 'magical'). The literature contains several reconstructions of Lewis' critique of nondescript ersatzism but none of these interpretations adequately address his main argument because they fail to see that Lewis' critique is based on broader methodological considerations. I argue that a closer look at his methodology reveals the broader objection he presented against nondescript ersatzism. This objection, I further argue, remains a challenge for the ersatzer who posits structure-less entities as possible worlds.

Pages

2335-2353

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Volume

195

Publication Date

2018

Keywords

Lewis, magic, method

Disciplines

Philosophy

Comments

This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0679-3 and may be cited as: 

Fisher, A.R.J. On Lewis against magic: a study of method in metaphysics. Synthese 195, 2335–2353 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0679-3

ISBN

0039-7857

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