Author ORCID Identifier

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1032-9542

Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Adaptive Behavior

Abstract

In his comment, McGann argues that in my “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices: Making Enactivism Social,” I have overlooked a group of enactivist theories that can be grouped under the participatory sense-making label. In this reply, I explain that the omission is due to the fact that such theories are not accounts of perception. It is argued that, unlike participatory sense-making, the approach of the “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices” article does not focus on the perceptual aspects of things social, but on the social aspects that are constitutive of perception in general. I conclude by underscoring the central argument of the original article: that the adequate notion to make enactivism about perception social is that of “perceptual practices,” a social practices-based notion of perception.

Pages

161–162

html

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1177/1059712319835162

Publisher

Sage Publications

Volume

27

Issue

2

Publication Date

3-7-2019

Keywords

Enactivism, perception, sociality, practices, intersubjectivity, culture

Disciplines

Philosophy

Comments

This is the accepted manuscript of the article. The version of record (VoR) is available at the following:

Arango A. Social enactivism about perception—reply to McGann. Adaptive Behavior. 2019;27(2):161-162. doi:10.1177/1059712319835162

ISSN

1741-2633

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